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DISAGGREGATING ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND
ACCOMMODATION
J.H. VERKERKE*
Virtually all contemporary accounts of civil rights laws proceed
on the assumption-or argue explicitly for the proposition-that
traditional antidiscriminationstatutes such as Title VII impose
duties on employers that are conceptually distinct from the
accommodation requirements embodied in more recent enactments
such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).' At a purely doctrinal level, this
distinction is self-evident. Both the ADA and the FMLA contain
specific provisions that have no counterpart in the older statutes.2
Moreover, employers' efforts to comply with accommodation mandates appear to require a fundamentally different strategy than
* Professor of Law and Director, Program for Employment and Labor Law Studies,
University of Virginia. This Article was prepared for a conference on Disability and Identity
at William and Mary School of Law on October 27, 2001. 1 gratefully acknowledge financial
support from the University of Virginia Law School Foundation and the Program for
Employment and Labor Law Studies. Copyright 0 2002 by J.H. Verkerke.
1. For these statutes, see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat.
241,253-56 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (2000). For arguments distinguishing antidiscrimination and accommodation,
see, for example, John J. Donohue III,Employment DiscriminationLaw inPerspective:Three
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2583, 2608-09, 2612 (1994); Samuel Issacharoff &
Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment DiscriminationLaw
Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 312-20 (2001);
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-14 (1996); Mark Kelman, Market Discriminationand
Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 840-55 (2001); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn,
ReasonableAccommodation of Workplace Disabilities,44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197 (2003).
2. See Family and Medical Leave Act § 2612(aXIXD) (granting categorical entitlement
to leave and reinstatement for "serious health conditions)"); Americans with Disabilities Act
§ 12111(8) (providing that employee must be able to perform "essential functions" of the job
in question); id. § 12111(9) (requiring the employer to make "reasonable accommodation");
id. § 12111(10)(A) (limiting employer's obligation when there is evidence of "undue
hardship"); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination to include a failure to make
"reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability").
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they commonly adopt in response to antidiscrimination statutes.
Under Title VII, for example, documenting an employee's record of
poor job performance ordinarily establishes a legally sufficient
defense against charges of discriminatory discharge. That same
evidence, however, quite often will be unavailing against the
ADA claim of an employee who has requested accommodation.'
Employers also have a virtually unqualified obligation under the
FMLA to permit covered employees to take up to twelve weeks of
unpaid, job-protected leave.'
Despite these apparent differences, important recent work by
Christine Jolls challenges the conventional wisdom that
antidiscrimination and accommodation can be distinguished so
easily.5 Her provocative thesis is that significant portions of
traditional antidiscrimination law-particularly cases invoking
disparate impact doctrine-are best understood as accommodation
requirements.' Jolls also builds on her prior work analyzing
accommodation mandates to show that within a supply and demand
framework, even ordinary antidiscrimination provisions may
impose costs on employers that are analytically indistinguishable
from accommodation costs.7 From these observations, she concludes
that antidiscrimination and accommodation are substantially
"overlapping rather than fundamentally distinct categories.'
This bold challenge to the distinctiveness of accommodation
mandates conceivably calls into question an essential element of the
approach that most scholars have taken to analyzing disability
discrimination law. Existing commentary develops at length the
theme that the ADA's accommodation provisions depart from the
conventional antidiscrimination model.9 Indeed, Stewart Schwab
and Steven Willborn's contribution to this Symposium provides a
3. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., 5 A.D. Cases 1526,1529 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 27,
1996) (finding that, with accommodations, plaintiff could have performed the essential
functions of his job, and that defendant had discriminated against plaintiff in violation of the
ADA).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
5. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642
(2001).
6. Id. at 652-66.
7. Id. at 684-95.
8. Id. at 645.
9. See sources cited supra note 1.
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paradigmatic example of this approach. Schwab and Willborn
carefully analyze both the ADA's conventional antidiscrimination
provisions, which they term a "soft" preference on behalf of
individuals with disabilities, and the unique features of the ADA's
accommodation mandate, which they call a "hard" preference.' 0 The
sharp distinction between "soft" and "hard" preferences motivates
both Schwab and Willborn's analysis of the structure of the statute
and their suggestions for doctrinal reform. Moreover, they predict
that fitture developments under Title VII and similar laws will
inexorably incorporate significant elements of the ADA's distinctive
model of "hard" preferences. 1 ' If, however, Title VII and other
traditional civil rights statutes have required employers, for many
years, to accommodate members of groups defined on the basis of
characteristics such as race, sex, and religion, then the ADA's duty
of accommodation merely extends to individuals with disabilities a
form of protection that is already available to other protected
classes. Jolls' critique thus potentially undermines both the
conventional understanding of accommodation duties and Schwab
ahd Willborn's predictive claim about how traditional civil rights
laws will evolve.
My goal in this Article is to reexamine the conventional wisdom
about accommodation mandates. Does accommodation differ
meaningfully from antidiscrimination, and if it does, how should
that difference affect legal policy? Part I considers to what
extent antidiscrimination and accommodation are in fact distinct
approaches to civil rights protection. Although Jolls' critique
demonstrates convincingly the need for greater care in using these
terms, I conclude that the categories of antidiscrimination and
accommodation draw a meaningful distinction between alternative
strategies for defining and remedying employment discrimination
and that the ADA's accommodation provisions differ in important
ways from preexisting law. Part II explores how this distinction has
influenced the development of employment discrimination law and
10. See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 1, at 1203-04.

11. Id. at 1202-04. Note that Senator Kerry and others have proposed expanding the duty
of religious accommodation under Title VII to more closely mirror the contours of reasonable
accommodation under the ADA. See, e.g., S. 2071, 104th Cong. (1997) (proposing a bill to
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish provisions with respect to

religious accommodation in employment and for other purposes).
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why it is likely to remain a significant fault line in public debates
over civil rights protections.
I. THE CONTENT OF OUR CATEGORIES

As many scholars have observed, even comparatively straightforward statutory language prohibiting employment discrimination
12
applies to a surprisingly diverse array of employer behavior.
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, for example, makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."13 Despite its simplicity, this provision not

only reaches decisions motivated by bigotry and animus,14 it
also prohibits employers from relying on statistically accurate
generalizations about protected groups.1 " It banishes customer
and coworker preferences as permissible bases for employment

decisions.16 Courts have even interpreted it to require employers to
demonstrate a substantial business justification for any practice
that creates a disproportionate adverse impact on protected group
members. 7 Thus the term "discriminate" covers a multitude of sins,

and each type of conduct potentially involves distinct public policy
concerns.
Given the complexity inherent in the antidiscrimination category

alone, it is reasonable to doubt that any single dichotomous
classification such as antidiscrimination and accommodation can
12. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 1, at 2584 (observing that antidiscrimination
.enactments have banned an array of diverse practices").
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1) (2000).
14. See Logan v. Denny's, 259 F.3d 558, 574 (2001) (acknowledging that plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination).
15. See, e.g., L.A. Dep't Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (barring
employer from using sex differences in average longevity to justify different rates of pension
premiums for men and women).
16. See EEOC v. Olson's Dairy Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165,169 (5th Cir. 1993) (discarding
a customer preference pretext for racially discriminatory hiring).
17. Of course, the Supreme Court sometimes has suggested that the theory of disparate
impact derives instead from Title VII, § 703(aX2). See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
448-49 & n.9 (1982). Lower courts, however, have not uniformly adopted this interpretation.
See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1987). In any event,
subsequent legislation has codified the judicially developed theory of liability and thus
eliminated any debate about its proper statutory source. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
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hope to create conceptual order out of such chaos. Indeed, alternatives abound. Employer conduct may be rational or irrational,
efficient or inefficient. Employees' claims may be brought on behalf
of an individual or as a class action. We might justify a particular
claim because it remedies historical injustice, prevents subordination of a traditionally disadvantaged group, vindicates an
ethical principle of equal consideration for all people, remedies a
market imperfection, or promotes more equitable distribution of
income and wealth.
Each of these distinctions offers important insight into the nature
of employment discrimination law and we will return to consider
several of them in the discussion that follows. Nevertheless, the
categories of antidiscrimination and accommodation have long
played a central role in scholarly discussions. For that reason, I
begin by defining these terms and exploring how they subdivide the
legal landscape.
A. Defining Terms
In both legal and popular usage, the term "antidiscrimination"
encompasses two basic impulses." The first derives as a historical
matter from the norm of color-blindness. It requires what is aptly
described as "negative equality" or the elimination of certain
illegitimate motives from decision-making processes. For example,
a court might apply the ADA to prohibit employers from acting on9
unfounded stereotypes about individuals who are HIV-positive.'
Thus, the principle of negative equality bars specific grounds for
employment decisions that the law deems illegitimate but otherwise
leaves businesses free to manage their affairs as they wish.
The second aspect of the antidiscrimination principle embodies
a form of "positive equality" under which firms have an affirmative obligation to use merit-based criteria to make employment
decisions. A court implementing a norm of positive equality thus
18. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory ofFairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CI. L. REV.235,23738, 313 (1970).

19. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637, 648-55 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic
HIV is a disability under the ADA, and remanding to determine whether an HIV-infected
patient posed a direct threat to her dentist).
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might demand that employers prove that their personnel tests
and other selection criteria are significantly related to job
performance.20 Aside from the (often substantial) burden of
producing persuasive evidence that the challenged practices serve
legitimate business objectives, employers may use any criterion
that they are able to defend in conventional meritocratic terms. The
norm of positive equality thus allows firms to discharge an
individual with a disability who produces less or costs more to
employ than other workers.
In contrast, an "accommodation" mandate requires employers to
make costly exceptions to their merit-based criteria in order to
increase employment opportunities for individuals who otherwise
would be excluded. The typical accommodation case involves an
individual with a physical or mental condition that interferes in
some way with his or her ability to participate fully in the
employer's normal operations. For example, a warehouse worker's
chronic lower back pain could hinder his ability to lift heavy crates.
An accommodation for this condition might require the employer
to purchase costly equipment or tolerate some delay or disrupted
work flow as a result of the worker's physical limitations.2 '
These additional costs would ordinarily justify a firm's decision to
discharge this employee, but the legal requirement of reasonable
accommodation obliges the employer to make an exception to its
normal criteria and incur some cost or loss of productivity as a
result.
If, however, a costless change in work procedures would allow
this worker to perform his job as effectively as others, then he
would need only to invoke the norm of positive equality rather
than seek an accommodation. In these circumstances, the employer
would be unable to defend on meritocratic grounds the decision
to discharge him. The distinction between positive equality and
accommodation thus rests on the magnitude of any costs associated
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (incorporating disparate impact standard into the ADA);
Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1999) (allowing employer to
present evidence of business relatedness for pre-employment test including leg lifts which
had a disparate impact on applicant suffering from the residual effects of polio).
21. See, e.g., Pluta v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 742, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(acknowledging that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether plaintiff was
fired from his warehouse job in violation of the ADA).
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with permitting an individual with a disability to perform a
particular job. If those costs are nonexistent, the norm of positive
equality provides sufficient protection. As those costs increase, the
case moves into the domain of accommodation.
Taken together, these three categories roughly define a
continuum. Efforts to enforce the norm of negative equality provoke
the least controversy and resonate most strongly with widely
accepted constitutional principles of equal protection.22 The more
demanding notion of positive equality draws its strongest support from the (almost mythological) American commitment to
meritocracy. 23 To a greater extent than negative equality, however,
the ideal of positive equality also clashes with the laissez-faire
values that still distinguish U.S. employment and labor regulation
from its far more intrusive European counterparts. 2' At the opposite
extreme from negative equality, the concept of accommodation
derives support from the ethical value of charity towards those who
have suffered some misfortune, from an economic desire to reduce
dependency on public disability insurance,' and from less widely
shared commitments to the broader cause of disability rights. 2
However, accommodation mandates-like related affirmative action
measures that extend preferences on the basis of race or sex-tend
to create significant tension with the same meritocratic ideals that
support both norms of positive and negative equality. As a result,
accommodation provisions inevitably provoke greater controversy
than efforts to enforce either component of the antidiscrimination
principle.
22. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1995) (holding the creation of majority AfricanAmerican and majority Hispanic-American voting districts unconstitutional because race had
been the predominant criteria in their creation).
23. See James A. Morone, The Struggle for American Culture, 29 POL. SCL & POL. 424,
425 (1996) (explaining the traditional American ideals of social mobility and individualism).
24. See Robert H. Haveman, TowardEquity and Employment:An Employment-Centered
Social Policy, LA FoLLETTE PoLYREP., Fall 1997, at 1, 2-4 (contrasting the highly protective
labor atmosphere in the E.U. and the less regulatory atmosphere in the U.S.).
25. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The ADA as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921

(2003).
26. See, e.g., Linda H. Krieger, Foreword-BacklashAgainst the ADA- Interdisciplinary

Perspectivesand Implicationsfor Social JusticeStrategies, 21 BERIELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1,7-11(2000) (detailing both a judicial and popular backlash against the broad endorsement
of disability rights represented by the ADA).
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The following schematic diagram illustrates how these three
categories define regions along a continuum, defined here by a
progression from relatively uncontroversial principles towards
comparatively contested notions of civil rights:

Negative Equality
Positive Equality

A oCMrnodation

Figure 1: The Continuum of Civil Rights Norms
Before applying this framework to the different types of conduct
regulated by the ADA, it is worth pausing briefly to compare these
conceptual categories to the terminology that other commentators
have used to discuss this field.
In their contribution to this Symposium, Schwab and Willborn
coin the terms "soft" and "hard" preference, which they define in
relation to a baseline of economic equality. Thus, the ADA imposes
a soft preference when it prohibits employers from "treat[ing]
individuals with disabilities less favorably than other workers of
equal productivity and cost."2 7 As their subsequent discussion of
several hypothetical cases makes clear, soft preferences require
27. See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 1, at 1209.
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both that employers avoid relying on illegitimate reasons and that
they eliminate any employment practices that do not serve the
meritocratic ideal of increasing profitability.' Schwab and
Willborn's terminology thus aggregates both the negative and
positive aspects of antidiscrimination into the single category of
soft preferences. A hard preference, in contrast, requires "employers
to engage in 'affirmative action' by treating individuals with
disabilities more favorably than other workers with better cost
and productivity characteristics."" This category corresponds
precisely to the canonical notion of accommodation. Thus the
terms "soft" preference and "hard" preference are no more, and no
less, than new and evocative labels for the familiar categories of
antidiscrimination and accommodation.
Jolls' critique also focuses on precisely this conventional
rhetorical dichotomy between "antidiscrimination" and "accommodation." She takes, however, an atypical approach to defining
these categories-adopting a doctrinal formulation for one and a
conceptual definition of the other. For Jolls, antidiscrimination
refers to the overlapping constitutional and statutory prohibitions
against discrimination contained in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, along with subsequent judicial interpretations of these
provisions. 0 This definition, though expressed in purely doctrinal
terms, corresponds closely to the conceptual category of soft
preferences and similarly encompasses both the negative and
positive aspects of the antidiscrimination norm."' As we will
consider in greater detail below, however, including the theory of
disparate impact within this doctrinal definition also creates
ambiguity about whether the category extends beyond positive
equality to encompass some accommodation requirements.
In contrast to her doctrinal approach to defining antidiscrimination, Jolls offers a thoroughly conceptual definition of
accommodation:

28. Id. at 1233-37.
29. Id. at 1211.
30. See Jolls, supra note 5, at 646-48.

31. See id. at 647 (referring to disparate impact doctrine).
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By an "accommodation" requirement... I mean a legal rule that
requires employers to incur special costs in response to the
distinctive needs (as measured against existing market
structures) of particular, identifiable demographic groups of
employees, such as individuals with (observable) disabilities,
and imposes this requirement in circumstances in which the
employer has no intention of treating the group in question
differently on the basis ofgroup membership (or"discriminating
against" the group in the canonical sense)., 2
Although this finely nuanced formulation is a bit difficult to
parse, most of its component parts are familiar. Like Schwab and
Willborn, Jolls refers to the special costs of accommodation and
identifies them by comparing the typical costs firms incur for other
employees in the market. She also contrasts decisions made solely
on the basis of an individual's group membership and thus excludes
from the definition all violations of the norm of negative equality.3 3
Significantly, Jolls' hybrid approach holds open the possibility that
enforcement under the disparate impact doctrine could give rise
to the "special costs" that distinguish accommodation mandates.
And as we have already seen, her doctrinal definition of antidiscrimination necessarily incorporates the theory of disparate impact.
Careful examination of these definitions thus reveals precisely how
Jolls' classifications come to overlap. For the moment, however, it
is best to postpone further discussion of the significance of that
overlap for the development of civil rights law and policy.
Like Jolls, Schwab, and Willborn, other commentators who have
discussed the place of accommodation in the scheme of civil rights
enforcement use an antidiscrimination category that aggregates
both positive and negative equality, and they draw a sharp contrast
between this aggregated category and cases involving accommodation.34 My approach to these issues differs in two ways. First,
I emphasize that the antidiscrimination principle encompasses
two distinct visions of equality. 5 Disaggregating these two norms
32. Id. at 648.
33. Id. at 649 (excluding from Jolla' definition of accommodation cases in which, for

example, "the employer intentionally treated blind employees differently on account of their
blindness apart from the resulting need for readers").
34. See generally Issacharoff & Nelson, supranote 1; Krieger, supra note 26.
35. See generally Fiss, supra note 18.
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clarifies both the components of antidiscrimination law and how
those components relate to accommodation requirements. Second,
by arraying regulated conduct on a continuum rather than forcing
it into strict dichotomous categories, my analysis provides a richer
framework for exploring the subtle relationships among the
constituent parts of modern civil rights statutes.
B. Sorting Conduct
So what precisely do these laws prohibit or require? Where along
the continuum, from negative equality to accommodation, do the
varied aspects of these statutes lie? It is to these questions that we
now turn.
The drafters of the ADA borrowed quite self-consciously from the
provisions of prior civil rights laws. Enacted in 1990, the statute's
core definition of "discrimination" derives directly from the
language of Title VII and case law interpreting it. 8 Accordingly,
the ADA incorporates both of the earlier law's broad doctrinal
approaches to establishing liability-disparate treatment and
disparate impact.
The theory of disparate treatment prohibits a wide range of
employer conduct that intentionally disfavors any person with a
particular protected trait because of that trait. As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly described the application of this doctrine
under Title VII:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less

favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations
be inferred from the mere fact
37
of differences in treatment.
For example, an employer might adopt a facially discriminatory
hiring policy that excludes all African Americans, women, or
36. Compare42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000), and § 12112(bX1), with id. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), and
§ 2000e-2(a)(2). Compare id. § 12112(bX6), with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (codifying disparate impact liability under Title VII).
Compare id. § 12112(b)(2), with id. §§ 2000e-2(b)-(d).
37. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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individuals with disabilities from the workplace."8 Alternatively,
plaintiffs might produce evidence that an employer rarely promotes
members of a protected group beyond entry-level positions and
that the relevant decision makers have made disparaging remarks
about that group.39 Or an individual may convince a court that
her employer's proffered reason for discharging her is untrue and
merely a pretext for an impermissible discriminatory motive. ° In
each of these cases, an illegitimate consideration of race, sex, or
disability has caused an adverse employment decision. The theory
of disparate treatment thus implements the norm of negative
equality by prohibiting firms from considering protected traits when
making important decisions about their employees.
In contrast, cases of disparate impact focus on whether a facially
neutral employment practice that has an adverse effect on members
of a protected group can be justified as "job-related for the position
in question and ... consistent with business necessity." 1 Although
both the ADA and Title VII now expressly codify the disparate
impact theory, the doctrine itself developed piecemeal over the
course of two decades of judicial decisions in race and sex
discrimination cases.' 2 The Supreme Court, in Griggsv. Duke Power
Co.,"3 unanimously endorsed the then-novel idea that Title VII
liability could be established without proving that an employer had
38. See, e.g., id. at 338 n.19 (detailing facially discriminatory hiring policies at Los
Angeles and Denver terminals); Bombrys v. City of Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1221 (N.D.
Ohio 1993) (finding that a policy barring diabetic individuals from serving as police officers
violated the ADA); RobertJ. Grossman, Payingthe Price:Events at Rent-A-Center Prove That
When Employers Don't Respect HR Today, They'll Pay Tomorrow, HR MAGAZINE, Aug. 1,
2002, at 28 (reporting allegations of sex discrimination suit including statements by CEO J.
Earnest Talley such as: "The day I hire women will be a cold day in hell" and "Get rid of
women any way you can").
39. See, e.g., Davis v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 560, 565, 571-72 (D.N.J. 1997)
(finding that employer had addressed African-American employee as "boy' and fired
employee for discriminatory reasons).
40. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX6) (incorporating into the ADA the disparate impact standard
developed through judicial decisions under Title VII); see also id. § 2000e-2(k)
(contemporaneously codifying of the disparate impact theory adopted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 amendments to Title VII).
42. See generally Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems,
and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985).
43. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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intentionally disfavored members of a protected class. While disparate treatment cases demand proof of the employer's subjective
intent, the theory of disparate impact technically requires no
proof of an evil motive. Instead, the doctrine requires a plaintiff to
make an initial showing that a particular practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected group. Successful proof
of adverse impact shifts the burden to the employer to prove that
the challenged practice is justified. Finally, the plaintiff has an
opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's proffered business
justification is merely a pretext, perhaps by presenting evidence
that an alternative practice exists which would serve the employer's
legitimate purposes just as well, but would exclude fewer members
of the protected group."'
The fact that disparate impact doctrine imposes on employers an
affirmative requirement of justification suggests that this theory
of liability involves a straightforward invocation of the norm of
positive equality. Indeed, some cases are best understood in those
terms. The theory of disparate impact, however, has a chameleonlike quality that allows courts to pursue different goals at different
times and in different situations. In practice, there are at least
three distinct versions of the doctrine: (1) an "objective theory" for
uncovering pretextual discrimination, (2) a concerted effort to
attack any "arbitrary barriers" to the advancement of protected
group members, and (3) a demanding requirement that any
exclusionary employment practices be genuinely "necessary" in
order to justify them. Various passages in the Griggs opinion can be
read to express all three facets of the doctrine,' 5 and to some extent,6
subsequent case law mirrors the Court's own indecisive stance.'
44. The Supreme Court first announced this tripartite structure inAlbemarlePaperCo.

v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). As discussed below, subsequent decisions and the codification
of disparate impact doctrine in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have altered some details of this
proof structure in ways that are unimportant to the present discussion. See infra note 48.
45. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("The evidence ...
shows that employees who have not
completed high school or taken the tests have continued to perform satisfactorily....); id. at
429-30 ("[The purpose of Title VIII was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers ...."); id. at 431 ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude ...
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.").
46. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENTDIsCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OFEQUALITY

INTHEORY AND DOCTRINE 70-73 (2001) (explaining "ambiguity" in the theory of disparate
impact between "narrow" and "broad*interpretations).
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Nevertheless, careful observers have detected some suggestive
patterns in the seemingly disorderly body of decisions.
According to George Rutherglen's incisive analysis, the most
defensible account of disparate impact doctrine casts it as a method
of proof that uses objective, rather than subjective, evidence to
uncover circumstances in which facially neutral practices serve the
pretextual purpose of excluding disfavored groups from the
employer's workforce."' On this view, the theory of disparate impact
derives from the same statutory provisions and serves the same
statutory purposes as the disparate treatment doctrine.4 Both
doctrines aim to combat pretextual discrimination. In support of
this contention, Rutherglen observes that many disparate impact
cases have followed a "sliding scale" approach to the employer's
defense ofbusiness justification-seemingly increasing that burden
when pretextual discrimination is more likely and decreasing it
when other evidence makes pretext less likely.49 Thus, he finds that
"weak evidence of adverse impact leads the court to impose a weak
requirement of business justification."' Conversely, "[wihen the
plaintiff has presented compelling evidence of adverse impact, the
defendant has usually been held to a higher standard of business
justification."5 ' Similarly, proving the existence of effective
alternative practices with less adverse impact reinforces the
suspicion that the challenged practice serves mainly to exclude
members of the protected class. On the other hand, the absence of

47. See George Rutherglen, DisparateImpact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination,73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987).
48. Years after Rutherglen's Virginia Law Review article was published, a number of
controversial Supreme Court decisions interpreting the civil rights laws narrowly, see, e.g.,
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (weakening employers' duty of
business justification and shifting the burden of proof to plaintiffs), spurred Congress to

amend Title VII. Among other changes, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the theory of
disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). The negotiated legislative history for
this provision makes it clear that Congress intended to restore the state of disparate impact
law to what had existed prior to the Court's decision in Wards Cove. See Civil Rights Act of

1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b) (Nov. 21, 1991) (limiting legislative history to an
"interpretive memorandum appearing at 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct.
25, 1991)"). It is precisely this body of law that forms the basis for Rutherglen's analysis of

the doctrine.
49. See Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 1321-26.
50. Id. at 1321.
51. Id. at 1322-23.
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effective alternatives supports the employer's
argument that this
52
particular practice is a business necessity.
As Rutherglen demonstrates, this "objective theory" provides a
convincing rationale for virtually all of the Supreme Court's own
disparate impact decisions and readily explains a substantial body
of lower court decisions as well.5" He acknowledges, however, that
some decisions are better understood as manifestations of a more
demanding quest to eradicate all employment practices that have
an adverse impact on protected groups.5 4 For our present purposes
in analyzing these cases, it is useful to distinguish between efforts
to eliminate only "arbitrary barriers"-those practices that cannot
be justified on meritocratic grounds-and an even stricter demand
that firms demonstrate the "business necessity" of all employment
practices with any exclusionary effect whatsoever.
Cases in the former category clearly invoke the norm of positive
equality. An employer may continue to use a practice after offering
persuasive evidence that it serves a legitimate business objective.
Requiring proof, however, that a practice is truly "necessary"rather than merely useful or job-related-predictably filters out at
least some meritocratic standards and thus requires the employer
to incur some cost or loss of productivity in order to avoid the
practice's exclusionary effect. For this reason, this third facet of
disparate impact doctrine most closely resembles an accommodation
requirement. 55
Despite these accommodationist aspects of disparate impact
doctrine, which are at least theoretically available to disability
discrimination plaintiffs, the ADA is best known for its distinctively
demanding duty of reasonable accommodation. The statute requires
employers to make "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
.with a disability ...unless [they] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business." 6 Unlike the toothless duty to accommodate
52. Id. at 1325-26.
53. See id. at 1330-31, 1335-36, 1338-40.
54. Id. at 1315-16.
55. It is precisely this feature of some disparate impact cases that leads Jolla to
characterize them as accommodation requirements. I return to discuss the significance of
this category below. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000).
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employees' religious practices that is contained in Title VII," this
provision has real bite. Employers must sometimes bear significant
costs connected with accommodations.5" There can be no doubt that
many ADA accommodation cases impose precisely the sort of special
costs associated with true accommodation requirements. Firms are
perhaps most likely to incur significant costs when they must
restructure jobs, modify schedules, acquire equipment, or provide
readers or interpreters.59 The cost and inconvenience of these
measures frequently goes well beyond the sort of assistance
they would provide as a matter of course to any valued employee.
In short, the statute requires employers to retain covered
individuals with disabilities in circumstances in which they would
be legally free to discharge other employees. Such legally mandated
exceptions to meritocratic standards are the essence of an
accommodation requirement.
It is once again helpful to recall that these categories simply
define regions on a policy continuum. The following schematic
diagram locates different aspects of discrimination doctrine in the
space stretching from negative equality through positive equality
to accommodation:

57. Id. § 2000e(j); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)
(holding employers may refuse religious accommodation ifit imposes more than "de minimis"
cost).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (stating that required accommodations may include "job
restructuring, part.time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations").
59. See, e.g., Rascon v. US West Communications Inc., 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to accept the employer's assertion that an employee's five-month leave of absence
for a post-traumatic stress disorder constituted an "undue hardship").
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Negative Equality
Disparate Treatment
Disparate Impact as "Objective".Theory

Positive Equality
.'Disparate Impact Attacking "Arbitrary Barriers",
Costless ADA Accommodations

Accomiodatiot
"De Minimis" Cost of Religious Accommodation,
Very Low. Cost ADA Accommodations
Disparate lmpactlequirlng Genuine Necessity
Comparatively Expensive ADA Accommodations..

Figure 2: Doctrines Across the Continuum
As the diagram makes clear, the three facets of disparate
impact doctrine span the full range of the legal policy continuum
from negative equality to accommodation. ADA reasonable
accommodation doctrine similarly ranges across categorical
boundaries. We have seen that truly costless accommodations
invoke only the norm of positive equality. Other, more burdensome,
accommodations sometimes involve merely "de mimimis" costs
comparable to those required for religious accommodations, or
they may impose higher costs than the most aggressive applications
of disparate impact doctrine. In short, these doctrines resist
simplistic categorization. As Jolls correctly observes, some aspects
of traditional antidiscrimination law--cases imposing a strong
"business necessity" requirement-undeniably overlap with the
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more recently enacted ADA accommodation mandates."' It is thus
improper to speak of antidiscrimination and accommodation as
strictly distinct categories.
My observation that these policies should be arrayed on a
continuum implies another objection to the conventional categorical
analysis. Both the public reaction to and the justification for
different approaches to civil rights enforcement depend not simply
on whether a particular rule can be called an antidiscrimination
measure or an accommodation mandate, though those labels often
have significant rhetorical power. Instead, legal policies become
progressively more controversial and therefore require more
specialized justifications as they fall farther towards the accommodation end of the continuum. This analysis suggests yet another
reason that we should resist the strict dichotomy between
antidiscrimination and accommodation. Uncritical use of the conventional terminology obscures important features of these varied
legal requirements.
Despite the strong theoretical case for avoiding simplistic
categories, however, there is at least a plausible practical justification for using the terms antidiscrimination and accommodation
as a convenient shorthand description of the field. The overwhelming majority of claims that are brought under the traditional
civil rights statutes involve disparate treatment and thus rely solely
on the norm of negative equality.61 Disparate impact claims
represent but a tiny fraction of all the charges brought to the
attention of the EEOC each year. 2 Moreover, as our earlier analysis
revealed, most of these cases are best explained by Rutherglen's
"objective theory" or as an attempt to eliminate "arbitrary barriers"
to minority advancement. Only a vanishingly small proportion of
the overall caseload can realistically be characterized as imposing
a strong "business necessity" requirement on employers. Thus, a
correspondingly tiny number of disparate impact cases impose
60. See Jolls, supra note 5, at 666 (rejecting the notion that antidiscrimination and
accommodation "are fundamentally distinct rather than overlapping notions").
61. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNatureof Employment
DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REV. 983,983-84 (1991) (documenting the dominance
of discharge claims and the paucity of class action claims under Title VII).
62. Id. at 1019-21 (detailing decline of class action litigation which implies a reduction
in disparate impact claims as well as systemic disparate treatment claims).
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anything like an implicit accommodation requirement.63 For this
reason, the genuine overlap between traditional antidiscrimination
statutes and accommodation requirements is probably small enough
to be disregarded for many purposes.6 4
Comparing the evidentiary requirements for Title VII disparate
impact cases and those for ADA accommodation claims tends to
reinforce this conclusion. In order to bring an accommodation claim
under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has a covered
disability and that there exists a reasonable accommodation that
would allow her to perform the job she holds or desires.65 Although
ADA plaintiffs often find these proof requirements daunting, a
disparate impact case under Title VII arises in even narrower
circumstances. A disparate impact plaintiff's prima facie case under
Title VII must identify a particular employment practice and prove
that the practice has had a practically significant adverse impact on
a protected group.66 Proof of adverse impact ordinarily requires
evidence of how the practice has affected a group of sufficient size
to allow for reliable statistical inferences. 67 As a result, disparate
63. The cases that Jolls cites tend to confirm this conclusion. She relies in part on
grooming cases that challenge restrictions many would characterize as 'arbitrary." Indeed
some of those cases arise in situations where a court could be suspicious that the practice has
a pretextual purpose. She discusses several cases challenging selection criteria in which the
appellate court simply reversed summary judgment for the employer and remanded for more
careful consideration of the evidence of business justification. These cases are entirely
consistent with non-accommodationist interpretations of the disparate impact doctrine.
Finally, Jolls refers to cases concerning claims of pregnancy discrimination connected with
inadequate leave policies. Once again, some of these cases may involve suspicions of
pretextual discrimination. The legal basis for others is at least open to question. And the
entire line of cases has been largely superseded by the enactment of the FMLA mandating
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for, interalia, the birth or adoption of a child.
64. For discussion of the practical implications of any remaining overlap, see supra text
accompanying notes 36-59.
65. See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir. 2001) ("To
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination [for failure to accommodate] under
the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) that s/he is disabled; (2) that s/he is otherwise qualified
for the position with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that s/he suffered an
adverse employment action because of his or her disability.").
66. See Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262,289-90 (D. Conn. 2001).
In most respects, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments codified pre-Wards Cove judicial
practice regarding the disparate impact theory. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). However, the
provision requiring plaintiffs to identify a specific practice that has caused the adverse
impact arguably makes the codified version even more demanding for plaintiffs than
preexisting law. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(BXi).
67. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2000).
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impact claims may challenge only the limited domain of practices
for which plaintiffs are able to gather the necessary data. In contrast, an ADA accommodation claim requires no aggregated data
or comparison to the experience of another demographic group.
Instead, the individual plaintiff need only develop evidence about
her own situation and the ability of her employer to bear any
accommodation costs.
Not surprisingly, the evidentiary differences between these two
types of claims go a long way towards explaining why ADA
accommodation claims filed with the EEOC far outnumber Title
VII disparate impact claims.6" Many, if not most, of these disparate impact cases were brought along with disparate treatment
claims and thus seem likely to have involved the use of an
"objective theory" to attack pretextual discrimination.6 9 Some cases
undoubtedly challenged "arbitrary practices," and a few more
imposed a strict requirement of "business necessity" and thus
required accommodation." As a practical matter, we can therefore
think of Title VII and other traditional civil rights statutes as
being almost exclusively concerned with negative equality. A small
number of cases seek to enforce the norm of positive equality, and
an even smaller number can be said to impose a limited form of
accommodation mandate. In contrast, cases under the ADA are
more evenly distributed across the full spectrum from negative
equality to accommodation." This striking difference in the
nature of claims makes the ADA distinctive and has led other

68. See Paul S. Miller, The EEOC's Enforcement of the Americans With DisabilitiesAct
in the Sixth Circuit,48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 217, 228 (1998) (noting that about twenty-eight
percent of a total of 64,495 ADA charges involved a claimed failure to accommodate). Thus,
a modest estimate of the number of accommodation charges approaches 20,000, while
disparate impact claims probably number under 100. See Donahue & Siegelman, supra note
61, at 1019-21.
69. See Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 1320.
70. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 46, at 73-76 (describing the Supreme Court's"continued
ambivalence" toward the theory of disparate impact).
71. Cases brought under the ADA run the gamut from straightforward allegations that
an employer discharged an incumbent employee after discovering that he had a disability,
EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., No. 92-C-7330 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 1993), to claims
based on the failure to accommodate an employee with epilepsy by offering him
reassignment, EEOC v. Complete Auto Transit, No. 95-73427 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 1997)
(issuing a $5.5 million verdict for plaintiff).
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commentators, with some justification, to employ the comparatively

simplistic categories of antidiscrimination and accommodation.
C. Competing Categories
We have seen that different aspects of civil rights laws can be
arrayed on a continuum from negative equality through positive
equality to accommodation. I have suggested that movements along
this continuum roughly correspond to variations in the degree of
public acceptance accorded different types of claims. Although some
aspects of traditional civil rights statutes overlap with the more
recently enacted ADA accommodation mandates, the extent of
this overlap should not be overstated. In fact, the conventional
dichotomy between antidiscrimination and accommodation may be
a useful shorthand description of the more complex reality that my
analysis reveals.
Although my focus here is on these conventional categories, there
are other grounds bn which one might distinguish different legal
requirements. One common strategy establishes as a baseline the
treatment individuals would receive in a certain hypothetical
market situation. Legal requirements, on this account, may be used
to remedy deviations from the hypothetical outcome or, sometimes,
to move beyond that outcome to pursue another social purpose
such as distributional equity or the economic integration of
disadvantaged groups.
Perhaps the best known and most successful use of a market
baseline is John Donohue's framework of "contingent equality,"
"intrinsic equality," and "constructed equality."72 In its unregulated
state, the labor market delivers equality to each worker that is
"contingent" not only on the quality of her work but also on the
attitudes of employers, coworkers, and customers towards her
personal traits. Features such as vast heterogeneity among
workers, the absence of publicly available information on their
individual productivity, and substantial barriers to free movement
among jobs, mute the market forces that might otherwise exert
pressure to combat discriminatory attitudes.73 With this imperfectly
72. Donohue, supra note 1, at 2583.
73. See id. at 2592-97.
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competitive environment, Donohue contrasts modern capital
markets. As he observes, the market for financial securities
achieves a higher level of "intrinsic equality" because relentless
economic pressures drive the price of each publicly traded asset
towards its true underlying value."' Every day, thousands of
sophisticated analysts attempt to predict how each asset is likely to
perform. Their investigative efforts and their willingness to trade
on every scrap of information that they glean simply overwhelm any
prejudices and stereotypes that individual traders might hold.75
In Donohue's framework, employment discrimination laws
initially sought to push the labor market from its natural state of
contingent equality towards the higher ideal of intrinsic equality.
For example, disparate treatment doctrine prohibits employers
from making decisions on the basis of certain protected traits. And
courts applying the theory of disparate impact require firms to
demonstrate that their practices evaluate workers on the basis of
their true productivity. Measures such as these aim to remove
the influence of race, sex, disability, and other contingent factors
from employment decisions and to force employers to hire and
compensate all employees according to their intrinsic worth.
Beyond intrinsic equality, however, lies the concept of
"constructed equality."76 This more expansive notion of equality
offers legal protection from productivity-driven market outcomes.
For example, it gives rise to claims that the special burdens of
childbearing and childrearing, of old age, or of physical and mental
disability entitle women, older workers, and individuals with
disabilities to preferential treatment in the labor market.77
According to this argument, fairness requires more than even the
intrinsic equality that an idealized competitive market would
deliver. The ADA's accommodation provisions, aggressive affirmative action efforts, and FMLA leave requirements are the most
prominent legal manifestations of the quest for constructed
equality.
Donohue's analysis offers a rich description of the evolving debate
over civil rights, beginning with an exclusive focus on achieving
74. See id. at 2591-93.
75. See id. at 2593.

76. See id. at 2605-09.
77. See id. at 2608-09.
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intrinsic equality for African Americans and culminating in more
recent scholarly work and legislative measures concerned with
pursuing constructed equality. 78 As Donohue observes, market
forces "at least push in the direction of intrinsic equality, but they
steadfastly resist the attainment of constructed equality." 79 In other
words, even imperfectly competitive labor markets have at least a
weak tendency to encourage hiring and compensating workers
according to their true productive potential. At the same time,
employers with the best and worst intentions alike face a market
incentive to avoid legal regulations that require preferential
treatment for some workers. These economic influences parallel
the pattern of public support noted earlier.8 " Not only must
accommodationist policies overcome the entrenched meritocratic
values that sustain antidiscrimination measures, they must
confront greater market resistance the farther they depart from
intrinsic equality. Donohue's analysis thus tends to confirm8 1the
wisdom of thinking about these legal policies on a continuum.
With all this talk of market forces, one might reasonably wonder

whether the eco nomist's norm of efficiency provides a useful
alternative to more traditional categories. The distinction between
efficient and inefficient rules has fascinated many economically
oriented commentators whose work relies on the normative premise
that if employment discrimination laws promote efficiency then
78. Although his account is persuasive in describing growing demands for regulation to
go beyond guaranteeing merely intrinsic equality, Donohue cites no cases to support his
claim that courts have embraced the principle of constructed equality in sex and age
discrimination cases. See Donohue, supra note 1, at 2611. The essay's introduction refers to
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) which has very limited potential to require
accommodation. Moreover, the language of the PDA itself explicitly embraces a principle of
equal treatment most closely tied to intrinsic equality. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). Although a few cases have rejected this limitation, others have
curtailed the clause's reach. The best that can be claimed for this line of cases is that they
embody an equivocal endorsement of a limited accommodation requirement that, for larger
employers, is now virtually superseded by the FMLA's leave requirements. Donohue also
cites two scholarly articles calling for a more accommodationist legal approach to pregnancy
in the workplace. Donohue, supra note 1, at 2608 n.64. Aside from the FMLA and similar
state leave statutes, there has been no groundswell of public support or legislative action on
such measures. In this respect, the FMLA and the ADA still stand as the most overtly
accommodationist statutes.
79. Donohue, supra note 1, at 2610.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
81. See Donohue, supra note 1,at 2583-85 (explaining how antidiscrimination laws have
evolved and broadened to encompass more protected classes and groups).
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they are, at' least marginally, more desirable as a result.82
Scholarly work has shown that prohibitions against race and sex
discrimination can accelerate the market's adjustment to a more
efficient nondiscriminatory equilibrium," that prohibiting the
practice of statistical discrimination may eliminate inefficiently
distorted incentives for disfavored groups to invest in their
human capital,8" and that the duty of reasonable accommodation
promotes labor market efficiency by preventing excessive employee
turnover.8 5 Expanding the category of efficient rules tends to bolster
the case for those rules. Indeed, legislative debates often focus on
the economic losses associated with employment discrimination."
No one could reasonably claim, however, that efficiency is an
essential characteristic for civil rights measures. Moral and political
considerations dominate the public debate while normative economic analysis exerts a secondary influence.
Although efficiency considerations have played a somewhat
subsidiary role, Mark Kelman's essay, Market Discriminationand
Groups, is a remarkably successful effort to decode the organizing
principle of civil rights laws." Kelman begins with the conventional
dichotomy between antidiscrimination, which he calls "'simple
discrimination,'" and 'accommodation."88 He argues that "[v]ictims
of simple discrimination possess ... a fairly strong, uncircumscribed 'right' to be free from such treatment, while those seeking
accommodation possess ... a colorable 'claim' on social resources
that competes with a variety of other claims on such resources,
82. See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming April 2003)
(manuscript on file with UCLA Law School). Compare Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and
the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987) (suggesting that Title VII efficiency
should be based on a balancing of costs), with John J. Donohue III, FurtherThoughts on
Employment DiscriminationLegislation:A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523
(1987) (rejecting Posner's analysis and developing his own "rough cost-benefit analysis" of

Title VII).
83. See Donohue, supra note 1, at 2611-12.
84. For application of this theory to disability discrimination law, see Kelman, supranote

1, at 860; Schwab & Willborn, supra note 1, at 1213.
85. See Verkerke, supra note 82.
86. "T].he continuing existence ofunfair and unnecessary discrimination ... denies people
with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis ... and costs the United States
billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity."

S. 933, 101st Congress § 2(a)(9) (1990) (findings of legislature prior to enactment of ADA).
87. See Kelman, supra note 1.
88. Id. at 834.
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a policy 'argument' to be balanced against other prudential
arguments."89 According to Kelman, society prohibits simple discrimination and requires accommodation for the same reason-to
prevent the subordination of any identifiable social group.90 In the
case of simple discrimination, however, the right is intelligible
without referring to a group. Every individual might conceivably
have a legal right to "fair" treatment by employers.91 Nevertheless,
prudential considerations dictate that the law should focus
enforcement resources on remedying instances of unfair treatment
directed towards members of socially sub-ordinated groups.9 2 In
contrast, Kelman claims that a legal duty to accommodate would
be nonsensical if applied generally to all individuals.93 Instead, the
only intelligible justification for accom-modation depends on its
ability to combat the social and economic subordination of
particular groups of citizens.9 '
Kelman's approach to accommodation duties might well be open
to criticism on the grounds that it ignores potential alternative
justifications such as the value of charity towards those suffering
from misfortune or the dignitary interests of individuals with
disabilities. His group-based theory of disability discrimination
laws, however, provides a uniquely parsimonious account of both
the political history and the doctrinal structure of Title VII and
subsequent laws. Kelman explores in considerable detail how the
antisubordination norm has influenced the evolution of these laws
and the rules governing where their protection begins and ends.95
Most notable for our present purposes, he emphasizes that the
public debate over these measures becomes more heated as they
move conceptually farther from the core color-blindness norm of
traditional civil rights laws.9" As Kelman suggests, accommodation
and affirmative action requirements command support only when
they serve an overriding public purpose. 97 Both rhetorically and
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 834, 859, 877.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 834.
Id.
Kelman, supra note 1.
Id. at 866, 892-93.
Id.
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substantively, the debate over accommodation has a different
character-shifting focus from rights arguments to disputed claims
on public resources.
It should be apparent that Kelman's analysis in no way
contradicts the approach to defining antidiscrimination and accommodation that has been the subject of this essay. Instead, his antisubordination theory provides a complementary account of the
social forces driving the adoption and enforcement of civil rights
laws. In particular, Kelman's conclusions reinforce my own
observation that it is possible to draw meaningful distinctions
among legal rules at different points along the civil rights policy
continuum.
D. Thinking About Costs
Returning now to Jolls' critique of the conventional dichotomy
between antidiscrimination and accommodation, 98 we can consider her analysis of costs. According to Jolls, the enforcement of
antidiscrimination rules sometimes imposes compliance costs on
employers that are conceptually and analytically similar to
accommodation costs.9 9 This possibility arises because employers
sometimes discriminate in order to maximize profits.'00 For
example, a firm whose customers would be reluctant to do business
with a woman may refuse to hire female sales representatives.' 0 ' Or
a company whose incumbent employees threaten to sabotage the
work of any African-American coworkers might maintain a racially
segregated workforce only in order to avoid the losses of productivity that would result from integration.0 2 As Jolls observes,
prohibiting employers from considering customer or coworker
attitudes such as these forces firms to suffer either reduced demand
for their products and services
or lower labor productivity in order
03
to comply with the law. 1
98. See Jolls, supra note 5.
99. Id. at 645, 686-87.

100. Id. at 686.
101. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981).

102. See, e.g., Johnson v. Strick Corp., 1996 WL 437049 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (detailing racial
slurs, racially derogatory jokes, and other harassment directed at an African-American

employee).
103. See Jolla, supra note 5, at 686.
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A conventional response from those who would defend a
distinction between antidiscrimination and accommodation asserts
that these coworker and customer preferences are illegitimate. Just
as society unhesitatingly labels an employer's own animus an
illegitimate reason for discriminating against members of protected
groups in the public sphere, 10 4 so we condemn the same attitudes
manifested by consumers and employees.1 8 As Kelman suggests,
administrative convenience may dictate that we remedy this form
of discrimination indirectly by regulating employers rather than
by trying to exert direct control over the behavior of customers
and coworkers." ° Moreover, we have reason to believe that the
prevalence and intensity of these preferences may diminish in
response to regulation.' Antidiscrimination laws both reinforce a
new social norm of equality and create opportunities for individuals
to learn that their underlying prejudice is unfounded. The
malleability of these psychic costs of regulation distinguishes antidiscrimination measures from accommodation mandates. Whatever
employers may think about its moral status, the economic costs of
accommodation remain. Firms cannot help but consider those costs
in their calculus of labor productivity."8
Of course, it is also true that simply labeling certain costs as
"illegitimate" does nothing to eliminate them.0 9 Jolls' analysis
correctly identifies the potential that all forms of civil rights
protection-from enforcing the norm of negative equality to
mandating accommodations-will impose costs on employers. " 0 As
Jolls demonstrates, both forms of costs will affect firms' behavior."'
Her analysis reveals how these regulations may influence wages
and employment levels of protected workers. The predicted effects
depend critically on the degree to which legal constraints against
104. Statutory exceptions for very small employers (and rooming houses) tend to confirm

the idea that although society may now disapprove of discriminatory attitudes in
comparatively intimate relationships, our laws prohibit people from acting on those beliefs

in broader market contexts. See supra note 1.
105. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 5, at 685.
106. See Kelman, supra note 1, at 848.
107. See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 1, at 1215-18.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Jolls, supra note 5, at 686; Kelman, supra note 1, at 848.
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
Jolls, supra note 5, at 687.
Id. at 688.
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wage discrimination and against discrimination in hiring and
discharge are binding.'1 2 In her earlier work on accommodation
mandates, Jolls considers several possible combinations and
derives predictions for the changes in wages and employment
levels for members of the protected group."-' One important result
is that with binding restrictions on both wage and employment
differentials, protected workers are likely to enjoy increased
relative employment levels with the same or higher relative wages.
Conversely, if legal constraints on employment differentials are not
binding, protected workers experience increased or unchanged
relative wages but suffer reduced relative employment levels.
empirical evidence which is
Finally, Jolls discusses some available
4
scenario."
latter
the
with
consistent
In order to determine the significance of costs for our present
discussion of antidiscrimination and accommodation, it is important
to distinguish positive from normative analysis. Economicallyoriented scholars can fruitfully debate positive predictions about
how legal regulation will affect wage and employment levels.
In this respect, Jolls' framework is a significant advance over
prior approaches that ignored the differences between mandates
affecting specific groups of workers as opposed to mandates
applying to workers as a whole."" For the purposes of normative
analysis, however, these predictions carry considerably less weight.
Policymakers would no doubt be troubled if, for example, it could be
shown that disability accommodations depress both wages and
employment levels for individuals with disabilities, or if the costs
of antidiscrimination measures had similar effects. So long as
the predicted effects are at least ambiguous concerning the welfare
of protected workers, however, the mere fact that conventional
antidiscrimination provisions impose costs on employers does little
to help us decide whether those particular costs are justified. As
Jolls recognizes, analysis in a supply and demand framework tells
us nothing at all about how the costs imposed by the norms of
negative and positive equality may differ in morally relevant ways

112.
113.
114.
115.

See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000).
Id. at 263-71.
Id. at 276-80.
Id. at 225-26.
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from one another and from accommodation costs." 6 So, although
her analysis provides valuable insight into the economic constraints
that face policy makers in this area, it does not purport to
determine how our values and ethical intuitions are translated into
basic policy objectives.
The policy continuum presented in this Part provides a richer
framework for analysis than the traditional dichotomy between
antidiscrimination and accommodation. The continuum highlights
the interrelationship among different components of the civil rights
laws and better reflects the variability of public support for various
forms of liability and remedy. Although Jolls' critique identifies
both areas of overlap between the traditional categories and
important parallels between the ways that antidiscrimination and
accommodation impose costs on employers,"' careful analysis of
the policy continuum shows why even the traditional dichotomy
serves as a useful shorthand for many purposes. The overwhelming
majority of claims and cases arising under traditional civil rights
laws invoke equality norms that may be called antidiscrimination.
What is distinctive about the ADA is principally that it gives rise to
a distribution of claims divided evenly between antidiscrimination
and accommodation. It is thus entirely appropriate to speak of ADA
accommodation claims as a significant innovation in civil rights
enforcement." 8
II. GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS

Once we have established that the distinction between antidiscrimination and accommodation is analytically meaningful it is
natural to consider whether that distinction does and should affect
legal policy. To what extent, if any, should the relationship between
these two categories influence political or legal decisions about
statutes such as Title VII and the ADA? What difference should it
make?

116. See Jolls, supra note 5, at 698 (explaining that her claim about antidiscrimination
and accommodation "is not a normative one: it is simply that the two categories overlap as
a factual matter").
117. Id. at 684-95.
118. See supra note 1.
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A. Section Five of the FourteenthAmendment
The legal issue to which Jolls devotes the most discussion is the
question of whether at least some accommodation mandates might
be a proper exercise of Congress' power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection."' What is at stake, of course, is the ability of
plaintiffs to recover monetary damages or injunctive relief against
states for violating statutory accommodation requirements. 20 There
are at least two distinct ways to approach this question. First, one
might be interested in determining as a matter of principle whether
Section Five authorizes expressly accommodationist measures. For
this inquiry, it can hardly matter whether Congress has gotten
away with a little bit of accommodation by means of the disparate
impact doctrine.' 2 'The question is instead whether the constraints
of federalism preclude accommodationist measures that reach so
clearly beyond what existing constitutional equal protection
doctrine requires. Or perhaps one could develop a normative argument that Congress should be free to define for itself what equal
protection means. In either case, the existence of the disparate
impact doctrine reveals nothing at all about these underlying
normative principles.
If, however, our goal is to predict what the Court will do with
a future claim challenging the application of accommodation
provisions to state government employees, then we might well look
to what it has permitted under Title VII. No case has yet come
before the Court that squarely raises the question of whether
disparate impact doctrine may be applied against the states.
Nevertheless, we may assume for the sake of argument that
disparate impact liability would be upheld. What follows from that
assumption is considerably less clear.
The legal test that the Court has announced in its recent
cases requires that challenged legislation "exhibit 'congruence and
119. See Jolls, supra note 5, at 672-84.
120. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
121. See Donohue, supra note 1, at 2584 (discussing the disparate impact doctrine). The
Court will decide this term how these arguments apply to claims brought under the FMLA.
See Hibbs v. Dep't ofHuman Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618

(2002).
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proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.""22 In considering what is congruent
and proportional to remedy equal protection violations, it is
significant to note that Title VII accommodation requirements are
unusual and the exception to normal practice. 21 One might fairly
characterize these exceptional situations as incidental to the main
thrust of Title VII. It is, however, obviously impossible to make a
parallel argument in defense of the ADA. Although the statute
contains all of the elements of traditional antidiscrimination
statutes, its accommodation provisions are central to its purposes
and form a substantial proportion of the cases arising under the
ADA. It is thus unsurprising that the Court has ruled already that
Title I of the ADA exceeds Congress' Section Five power to regulate
states.124 This result rests in large part on the fact that distinctions
based on disability receive only rational basis scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.'2 5 The Court has taken pains to point out,
however, that the requirements of Title I include extensive duties
of accommodation, and these duties extend far beyond the scope of
protections afforded to individuals with
the constitutional
121
disabilities.
Although distinctions based on race and sex are subject to
heightened scrutiny, it seems doubtful that accommodation
measures could be defended on those grounds. Any explicit race- or
sex-conscious policy would itself be subject to challenge as a breach
of the government's own duty of equal protection. 1 ' More subtle
accommodationist measures would instead fail the Court's analysis
of "congruence and proportionality." 2 ' The family and medical leave
mandated under the FMLA, for example, might arguably bear some
relationship to improving the job prospects for women of childbearing age. 129 However, the nexus between legislation mandating
122. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
123. See Jolls, supra note 5, at 667 (suggesting the idea that antidiscrimination and
accommodation are distinct categories "fails to recognize the case law ...imposing
accommodation requirements as a matter of Title VII disparate impact law"); supra notes

119-22 and accompanying text.
124. Garrett,531 U.S. at 360.
125. See, e.g., id. at 366-67.

126. Id. at 372.
127. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
128. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); Garrett,531 U.S. at 365-66.

129. See Jols, supra note 5, at 660-62 (analyzing FMLA leave requirements as a measure
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leave that is equally available to men with "serious medical
conditions" or with newborn or newly adopted children and the
problem of constitutionally prohibited sex discrimination is sufficiently tenuous that the FMLA will almost surely meet the same
fate that the ADA suffered in Garrett.3 0 As I have suggested
already, the Court's assumed willingness to condone some very
limited accommodation under the disparate impact doctrine cannot
sustain the overt accommodation requirements of statutes such as
the ADA and the FMLA.
B. Affirmative Action
Another notorious flash point of controversy in the debate over
civil rights protections is the issue of affirmative action. The term
has been used to describe everything from careful efforts to ensure
that job recruitment efforts do not neglect schools or areas in which
members of minority groups predominate to rigid numerical quotas
for hiring, promotion, or layoff.' Public and judicial reaction to
these measures likewise ranges from broad support for expanding
the pool of minority candidates to fierce controversy over strong
forms of preference granted on the basis of protected group
membership.132

We have seen that strong accommodation requirements create
tension with the meritocratic ideal that underwrites the norm of
positive equality. Selecting, on the basis of sex or race, someone who
is less qualified, and thus likely to be less productive, similarly
offends this meritocratic principle. In the public debate over
affirmative action, we observe that policies become progressively
to enforce equal protection).
130. Thus far, circuit courts are unanimous in holding that the FMLA is not a valid
exercise of Congress' Section Five power. See Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th
Cir. 2000). But see Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 856 (9th Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing FMLA from ADA in that the former was aimed at remedying sex
discrimination and deserves strict scrutiny analysis), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,185 (1987) (holding that state's fifty
percent promotion requirement for African Americans was permissible under Fourteenth
Amendment); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,573 (1984) (holding
that lower court exceeded its power when it approved inijunction requiring white employees
to be laid off when seniority system would have laid off some black employees).
132. See Sandra R. Levitsky, ReasonablyAccommodating Race: Lessons from the ADA for
Race-TargetedAffirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. J. 85, 86-90 (2000).
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more controversial as they more closely approach cases of costly
accommodation. 1" The source of public resistance is the same in
both situations. Preferences on the basis of race and sex, however,
also implicate stronger equal protection norms, embodied in the
heightened scrutiny of race- and sex-conscious classifications,
that disfavor group-based decision making. For this reason,
public disapproval of affirmative action tends to be more vehement than opposition to equally preferential forms of disability
accommodation. Voluntary measures to assist individuals with
disabilities likewise provoke none of the controversy invariably
associated with otherwise comparable voluntary preferences for
minorities or women. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of reaction
to varying degrees of affirmative action preference is entirely
3
consistent with the analysis of accommodation presented here.'
C. The Rhetoric of Low Accommodation Costs
A frequently heard claim of disability rights advocates is that the
real burden of accommodation costs on employers is very slight.'3 5
Within the framework of this Article, such claims can be fruitfully
understood as an effort to translate accommodation claims into
ones invoking the norm of positive equality. As the level of accommodation costs falls towards zero, we move along the policy
continuum towards the region of positive equality. I have suggested
that most people's moral intuitions about legal requirements
respond to movements along this continuum. Advocates of disability
rights thus understand quite clearly that moving rhetorically, or
even better in real terms, towards the less controversial end of the
spectrum serves the political goal of securing support for legislation
such as the ADA.

133. See, e.g., James Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith,Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects ofSelf
Interest,RacialAffect, and StratificationBeliefs on Whites' Views, 61 SOC. FORCES 797 (1983)
(discussing white opposition to preferential treatment for minority groups).
134. See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Jolla, supra note 5, at 650-51 (suggesting that an accommodation
requirement that imposes costs for employers may ultimately benefit employees not targeted
for the accommodation). For discussion of the available empirical evidence on this question,
see Peter David Blanck, The Economies of the Employment Provisionsof the Americans with
DisabilitesAct: PartI-Workplace Accommodation, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 898-908 (1997).
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D. Politics and JudicialPower
Once the political battle has been won, however, the resulting
legislation faces another important hurdle before it actually
compels employers to make costly accommodations. As countless
academic commentators have observed, judicial interpretation of
the ADA has significantly limited the coverage and scope of the
statute in a variety of ways.""6 Courts have expressed no overt
hostility to the remedial aims of the legislation. However, the duty
of reasonable accommodation seems to trouble many judges for at
least two distinct reasons. Most relevant to the analysis presented
in this Article, the comparatively controversial nature of accommodation mandates makes courts cautious about extending those
duties too far. As other commentators' criticisms make clear, judges
have the power to nullify the most aggressive aspects of civil rights
enforcement and thus to domesticate novel statutes like the ADA.
The very novelty of the legislation gives rise to a second judicial
concern over the difficulties of interpretation. As I have argued in
other work, case law has made very little progress in developing a
robust doctrine to govern the duty of reasonable accommodation.
Rather than face this uncharted doctrinal territory, judges have
instead restricted the coverage of the statute by narrowly
interpreting the definition of a covered "qualified individual with a
disability."1 37 Whatever their motivation, however, it is difficult to

deny that the judicial reaction to the ADA has been considerably
more skeptical and resistant than it has been toward more
traditional civil rights legislation. This reaction mirrors closely the
patterns of public support across the civil rights policy continuum.

136. See, e.g., Kreiger, supra note 26, at 7.

137. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356,360 (2001). See generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., SubstantiallyLimited Protectionfrom
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the
Definition of Disability,42 VILL. L. REv. 409 (1997) (lamenting the many judicial decisions
that narrowly construe the ADA's definition of disability).
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CONCLUSION

We saw in Part I that the concepts of antidiscrimination and
accommodation sometimes provide a useful shorthand terminology
for civil rights policies at opposite ends of a continuum. However,
careful attention to subtle gradations along that continuum can also
reveal a more precise picture of the entire distribution of claims
under the various statutes. Part II showed that contemporary
debates about issues such as Congress' Section Five powers,
affirmative action, the level of accommodation costs, and judicial
power to interpret civil rights statutes all follow patterns consistent
with the analysis in Part I. Although accommodation mandates
undoubtedly share some characteristics with more traditional
antidiscrimination rules, the policies are, for most practical
purposes, meaningfully distinct. Future analyses of these issues
should undoubtedly take careful account of the ways antidiscrimination and accommodation may subtly overlap. Neither
scholars nor participants in public debates about civil rights policy,
however, need to consider abandoning the distinction that has
informed so many discussions about these issues.

